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NOTES
The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act*
Many nations do not accord conclusive effect to foreign 1 judgments unless their own judicial decrees are reciprocally enforced by
the country rendering the judgment.2 The law in the United States
is unsettled, with some states holding that foreign judgments are
reviewable on the merits if the judgment forum similarly reviews
the merits of American decrees, 3 while others accord conclusive
effect to valid foreign money judgments regardless of the effect
accorded American decrees in the judgment forum. 4 Judgments in
the latter states would seem entitled to conclusive enforcement
in countries requiring reciprocity. However, such conclusive recognition has been hindered because many civil-law courts tend to
look solely to the legislation of other countries in determining the
treatment accorded there to foreign judgments,6 and few states in
the United States have enacted recognition legislation. 0 Some civil• 9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. 27 (Supp. 1964).
I. The adjective "foreign" is used throughout this discussion solely with reference
to foreign nations.
2. For a list of countries adhering to this approach, see Nadelmann, French Courts
Recognize Foreign Money-Judgments-One Down and More To Go, 13 AM. J. COMP,
L. 72, 78-80 (1964); Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments
Abroad and What To Do About It, 42 IoWA L. R.Ev. 236, 249•57 (1957).
3. Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So. 2d 870 (1947); Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla,
764, 75 So. 35 (1917); Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 646, 147 Atl.
715, 717 (1929); Traders Trust Co. v. ,Davidson, 146 Minn. 224, 227, 178 N.W. 735,
736 (1920); In re Vanderborght, 91 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Ohio C.P. 1950) (dictum); Union
Sec. Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513 (1925) (dictum); cf. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 524, § 11 (Supp. 1963) (Canadian judgments granted the same effect as New
Hampshire judgments are given in Canada). Sec Smith, The Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in American Courts, 19 MILlTARY L. R.Ev. I, 8-10 (1963). See also Tremblay
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 97 Me. 547, 55 Atl. 509 (1903) (court in which enforcement is
sought may always inquire into merits of the original action).
4. E.g., 164 E. 72d St. Corp. v. Ismay, 65 Cal. App. 2d 574, 151 P.2d 29 (1944);
Coulbom v. Joseph, 195 Ga. 723, 733, 25 S.E.2d 576, 581 (1943); Truscon Steel Co. of
Canada v. Biegler, 306 Ill. App. 180, 28 N.E.2d 623 (1940); Ticonderoga Pulp &: Paper
Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y.S. 284, af/'d, 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669 (1927);
Christoff Estate, 411 Pa. 419, 192 A.2d 737 (1963); REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 434, comment b (1934); cf. l3onfils v. Gillespie, 25 Colo. App. 496, 139 Pac. 1054
(1914) (dictum recognizing a trend to grant conclusive effect); Bata v. Bata, 163 A,2d
493 (Del. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961); Succession of Fitzgerald, 192 La.
726, 731, 189 So. 116, 117 (1939); Grey v. Independent Order of Forrestcrs, 196 S.W.
779 (Mo. App. Ct. 1917) (dictum). See Smith, supra note 3, at 11-14. See also MoNT,
R.Ev. ConE § 93-1001-27 (1964), and ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 43.190 (1963), which declare that
foreign judgments are only prima facie,evidence of the existence of a right between
the litigants. This presumption, however, is rebuttable by only a limited number of
generally accepted defenses, which do not include the defense that the judgment
forum denies reciprocal recognition of American judgments.
5. Cf. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and
What To Do About It, 42 IowA L. REv. 236, 252 (1957).
6. Prior to the promulgation of the Uniform Act, recognition statutes had been
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law courts are therefore inclined to conclude, often erroneously, that
a state does not enforce foreign judgments, and thus does not meet
the reciprocity requirement, if there is no recognition legislation in
that state.7
Even those foreign courts that do look to the case law on the
recognition of foreign judgments sometimes ignore state court
decisions granting reciprocity, and refer instead to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Hilton v. Guyot8 that the failure of
the courts of a foreign nation to grant conclusive effect to the
judgments of an American court precludes conclusive enforcement
in the United States of a money judgment rendered in that nation
against an American defendant. 9 Reliance upon Hilton often leads
those foreign courts which themselves demand reciprocity to conclude that the "law of the United States" denies conclusive effect
to foreign judgments.Io The error in this conclusion lies in the
foreign courts' failure to recognize that Hilton has not been considered binding on state courts because it was decided on appeal
from a lower federal court and the decision was based on nonconstitutional grounds.I1 In 1962, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws sought to remedy this confusion
and encourage foreign recognition of American judgments by promulgating the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act, 12 which, with certain exceptions, requires the conclusive enforcement of foreign money judgments which are final and enforceable where rendered.IS The Uniform Act was enacted by Illinois
and Maryland in 1963.14
Among the Uniform Act's exceptions to conclusive enforcement
is the traditional protective measure of refusal to enforce a judgment
rendered by a judicial system which does not afford impartial
enacted only in California (CAL. CoDE CIV. PROC. § 1915), Maryland (MD. CODE .ANN.
art. 35, § 39 (1957)), Montana (MoNT. R.Ev. CODE § 93-1001·27 (1964)), New Hampshire
(N.H. REv. STAT• .ANN. ch. 524, § 11 (Supp. 1963)), and Oregon (ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 43.190
(1963)).
7. See SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 177 (2d ed. 1959).
8. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
9. The Court held that the foreign judgment was to be treated as prim.a facie
evidence of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 227.
10. Cf. Nadelmann, supra note 5, at 255-56; Smith, supra note 3, at 26-27.
11. Cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 430e, comment e, at 3 (Tent.
Draft No. 11, 1965); Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the· Law of Foreign Judgments: A. His•
torical-Critical Analysis, 16 LA. L. REv. 465, 472 (1956).
12. 9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. 27 (Supp. 19.64) (hereinafter cited as UNIFORM A<:r).
13. UNIFORM Acr §§ 2, 3. The requirement that the judgment be conclusive and
enforceable where rendered is well established at common law. See cases cited in
Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 Omo ST. L.J. 291, 309
n.88, 313 n.110 (1963).
14. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 77, §§ 121-29 (Supp. 1964); MD. CODE .ANN. an. 35, §§ 53A·l
(Supp. 1965).
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tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law.111 Lack
of jurisdiction over either the person of the defendant10 or the subject matter of the litigation17 is specified as a situation in which
due process is conclusively considered denied. To ensure that American courts will be relatively uniform in their application of standards of personal jurisdiction when examining the proceedings in
the judgment forum, the Uniform Act prescribes certain instances
in which the judgment forum shall be deemed validly to have exercised jurisdiction.18 Although the specified standards tend to reflect
old notions of constitutional limitations on jurisdiction over nonresidents in domestic litigation,19 the Commissioners have provided
for the recognition of the modern, continuing expansion of jurisdictional powers by adding a provision that courts may recognize other
bases of jurisdiction which are constitutionally acceptable in the
United States.20
The court in which enforcement of the judgment is sought is
15. UNIFORM: Acr § 4(a)(l). Cf. Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711
(1915) (refusal to enforce a Mexican judgment rendered without a fair hearing).
It is not required, however, that the foreign procedures duplicate those utilized in
the United States. 9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. 30 (Supp. 1964) (Commissioners' Note):
cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. II3 (1895).
16. UNIFORM Acr § 4(a)(2). Cf. Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio
1951); Bethune v. Bethune, 192 Ark. 8II, 94 S.W.2d 1043 (1936); Rhodesian Gen. Fin.
&: Trading Trust, Ltd. v. MacQuisten, 170 Misc. 996, II N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1939):
cases cited in Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United
States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 44, 50 n.46 (1962).
17. UNIFORM Acr § 4(a)(3). Cf. In the Matter of the Estate of Gillies, 8 N.J. 88, 83
A.2d 889 (1951); Romanchick v. Howard Sav. Institution, Il8 N.J.L. 606, 194 Atl, 185
(E. &: A. 1937); Matter of Will of Lockwood, 147 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Surr. Ct. 1955): San
Lorenzo Title &: Improvement Co, v. City Mortgage Co., 124 Tex, 25, 73 S.W.2d 513
(1934).
18. UNIFORM Acr § 5(a) provides:
The foreign judgment shall not be refused recognition for lack of personal
jurisdiction if:
(1) the defendant was served personally in the foreign state:
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings, other than for the
purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceedings or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over him;
(3) the defendant prior to the commencement of the proceedings had agreed
to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject
matter involved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state when the proceedings
were instituted, or, being a body corporate had its principal place of business,
was incorporated, or had othenvise acquired corporate status, in the foreign state;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign state and the proceedings
in the foreign court involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out
of business done by the defendant through that office in the foreign state: or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state
and the proceedings involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of
such operation.
19. The currently expanded bases of jurisdiction are discussed in Currie, The
Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U.
ILL. L.F. 533; Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569 (1958); Reese &: Galston,
Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IoWA L.
REv. 249 (1959); Comment, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1028 (1965).
20. UNIFORM Acr § 5(b).
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given discretion by the Uniform Act to refuse to enforce the judgment if the defendant did not receive notice of the foreign proceedings in time to defend, 21 or if the judgment was obtained by fraud. 22
The act is somewhat ambiguous, however, as to what situations are
encompassed by these provisions. If no notice whatever was given, or
if the notice given was inadequate to meet due process objections, it
would seem that the act's provisions for compulsory refusal to enforce
a judgment rendered without jurisdiction23 would take precedence
over the discretionary provision, because failure to give adequate
notice is a jurisdictional defect.24 Since discretion to refuse enforcement of a judgment when the defendant did not actually receive
notice in time to defend implies that the court also has the authority
to enforce the judgment, the best interpretation of this discretionary
power seems to be that the Commissioners intended it to operate only
in instances where the plaintiff had given notice sufficient to satisfy
due process requirements, but notice was not actually received by the
defendant in time to defend. With regard to the defense of fraud, it
is presumed that the Commissioners intended to codify the accepted
common-law view that a foreign judgment should be refused enforcement only on the grounds of extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, fraud. 25
If this assumption is accurate, the implied discretion to enforce a
judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud on the foreign court
seems inconsistent with the traditional view that extrinsic fraud completely vitiates the judgment by preventing the unsuccessful party
from presenting his case.26 The Maryland legislature has reflected this
theory by altering its version of the Uniform Act to provide for
compulsory refusal to enforce a judgment obtained by fraud.27
21. UNIFORM Ac:r § 4(b)(l). Cf. Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 21 So. 2d 141, cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 718 (1945); In the Matter of the Estate of Paramythiotis, 15 Misc. 2d ,
133, 181 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Surr. Ct. 1958); In re Deckert's Will, 141 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Surr.
Ct. 1955).
22. UNIFORM Ac:r § 4(b)(2). Cf. The W. Talbot Dodge, 15 F.2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1926);
Perdikouris v. The Olympos, 185 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Va. 1960); Title Ins. & Trust
Co. v. California Dev. Co., 171 Cal. 173, 152 Pac. 542 (1915); In the Matter of the
Estate of Gillies, 8 N.J. 88, 83 A.2d 889 (1951); cases cited in Peterson, supra note
13, at 317-18; REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 440 (1934).
23. UNIFORM Ac:r § 4(a)(2).
24. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). See also
In re Deckert's Will, 141 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Surr. Ct. 1955). It has been indicated that
due process requires state courts not to enforce a foreign judgment rendered without
jurisdiction. See Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 229 (1946) (dictum); Cherun v. Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292, 296, 298 (D.D.C. 1964); cf. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90
(1917).
25. See cases cited supra note 22; Reese, The $tatus in This Country of Judgments
Rendered Abroad, 50 CoLuM. L. REY. 783, 794 (1950). Extrinsic fraud is a fraud on
the judgment court which deprives the aggrieved party of an adequate opportunity
to present his case, whereas intrinsic fraud involves matters actually passed upon by
the court rendering the judgment. Ibid.
26. See cases cited supra note 22.
27. Mn. CODE ANN. art. 35, § 53D(a)(4) (Supp. 1965). It is not clear, however,
whether this provision is limited to extrinsic fraud.
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The Uniform Act extends further discretionary authority to stay
the enforcement proceedings if the defendant intends to appeal in
the judgment forum. 28 Discretion is also given to refuse recognition
of the judgment if the decree is repugnant to the policy of the state
in which enforcement is sought,29 the proceedings in the foreign
state were contrary to an agreement between the parties,80 the
judgment conflicts with a prior judicial decree binding upon the parties, 31 or jurisdiction was .based solely on personal service and the
court feels that the action should have been dismissed on the
ground of forum non conveniens.32 It was necessary to leave the recognition of these defenses in the discretion of the state courts because of the need to accommodate the discord existing among the
states as to the propriety of the defenses. While a majority of state
courts will refuse to enforce a foreign judgment which is repugnant
to state policy,33 at least one court has refused to entertain this
defense, on the theory that the original cause of action merges with
the judgment so that the action to collect the judgment is entirely
distinct from the original action. 84 Discretion in relation to the
power to refuse enforcement of a judgment when the foreign proceedings were contrary to an agreement between the parties is
similarly appropriate because of the multitude of possible types of
agreements and the attending variances in courts' reactions to them.
For example, in domestic litigation agreements by the parties purporting to deprive themselves of recourse to the courts have traditionally
been held void as contrary to public policy.35 In more recent years,
however, courts in which the original suits are brought have tended
to decline jurisdiction in deference to reasonable agreements to
28. UNIFORM ACT § 6.
29. UNIFORM ACT § 4(b)(3).
30. UNIFORM ACT § 4(b)(5).
31. UNIFORM ACT § 4(b)(4).
32. UNIFORM ACT § 4{b)(6).
33. See, e.g., Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818 (1944); In the
Matter of the Estate of Gillies, 8 N.J. 88, 83 A.2d 889 (1951); In the Matter of the
Will of Topcuoglu, 11 Misc. 2d 859, 174 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Surr. Ct. 1958); Smith v. Smith,
72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889 (1943); Smit, supra note 16, at 52. Compare Zanzonico
v. Neeld, 17 N.J. 490, 111 A.2d 772 (1955) (Italian adoption decree enforced where
child resided with her adoptive parents in the United States after adoption despite
the nonfulfillment of a statutory requirement that the child reside with the adoptive
parents for one year preceding the adoption).
34. Neporany v. Kir, 5 App. Div. 2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1958) (Canadian money
judgment for seduction and criminal conversation enforced although the cause of
action was expressly proscribed in New York by statute). But cf. cases cited in Peterson,
supra note 13, at 316 n.120; Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo•
American Law, 33 MICH, L. REv. 1129, 1139-40 (1935), stating that the doctrine of
merger is inapplicable to foreign judgments.
35. See, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180, rehearing denied, 359 U.S. 999 (1959); Sebree v.
Rosen, 374 S.W.2d 132, 140 (Mo. 1964); Arsenis v. Atlantic Tankers, Ltd., 39 Misc. 2d
124, 240 N.Y.S.2d 69 (N.Y. City Ct. 1963); Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Penn•
sylvania Plan, Inc., 27 Pa. D. &: C.2d 554 (Philadelphia County 1962).
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oust those courts of jurisdiction.86 It should be noted, however, that
it is generally accepted that a court's refusal to decline jurisdiction
does not render that court's judgment assailable.37 The Uniform
Act's proviso allowing a court to refuse to enforce a judgment
rendered in a foreign court which refused to defer to an agreement
by the parties purporting to oust that court of jurisdiction seems
to be supported by no great amount of authority. Again, because
of the varying circumstances under which the problem arises, the
courts of even a single state have accorded divergent treatment to
judgments conflicting with prior judicial decrees. 38 The necessity
of leaving recognition of a defense in the courts' discretion was
most compelling, however, with regard to the novel authority to
refuse enforcement of a judgment rendered in an inconvenient
forum. No cases have been discovered in which this power was
exercised at common law. Indeed, some courts feel that the plaintiff
should not be deprived of a forum where a court has the power to
exercise jurisdiction, and therefore do not recognize the power to
dismiss even the original proceedings on the ground of forum non
conveniens.89 It thus appears that the Commissioners intended this
power to alter the existing law. While the power given by the act
allows a state to protect its citizens from seriously inconvenient
litigation, its wisdom may be challenged on the ground that forum
non conveniens is a theory whereby the court in which the suit is
originally brought may, in its discretion, dismiss a suit over which
it could properly exercise jurisdiction.40 It would seem that another
court should not be permitted to intrude upon this discretion,41
36. See, e.g., Wm. H. Muller &: Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (~d
Cir. 1955) (deference to an agreement in the litigants' contract that all disputes arising
out of the contract would be tried in Swedish courts); Pakhuismeesteren, S.A. v. The
S.S. Goettingen, 225 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (deference to agreement to try disputes in a German court); E. H. Marhoefer, Jr., Co. v. Mount Sinai, Inc., 190 F. Supp.
355 (D. Wis. 1961) (arbitration agreement). See also Berry v. Struble, 20 Cal. App. 2d
299, 66 P .2d 746 (1937) (agreement not to sue).
37. Cf. Wm. H. Muller &: Co. v. Swedish Am. Line Ltd., supra note 36, at 808:
"[T]he parties by agreement cannot oust a court of jurisdiction otherwise obtaining.••."
38. Compare Perkins v. De Witt, 197 Misc. 369, 94 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1950), order afj'd
in part, reversed in part, 279 App. Div. 903, 111 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1952) (reversal of an
order refusing to enforce a Philippine money judgment which conflicted with a prior
New York judgment), with Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., 203 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d
641 (1952) (enforcement of a British judgment on an oral employment contract which
had been held -unenforceable by a Greek court in a second proceeding as a contravention of Greek public policy).
39. Alabama, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin are
listed in Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 740, 741 n.8, 753 n.45 (1962), as having rejected
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
40. Cf. People ex rel. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry. v. Clark, 12 Ill. 2d 515, 147 N.E.2d
89 (1957); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum &: Transp. Co., 174 Misc. 601, 658,
21 N.Y.S.2d 651, 706 (1940).
.
41. See People ex rel. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry. v. Clark, supra note 40 (refusal to
dismiss action on grounds of forum non conveniens cannot be corrected by man-
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especially if the foreign tribunal does not even recognize the defense.42
An interesting problem is presented as to whether state involvement in the enforcement of foreign judgments is unconstitutional
as an infringement on the exclusive federal power over foreign affairs. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 43 the Supreme Court
declared that a federal common law controls any litigation concerning the public acts of foreign sovereigns. The Court supported the
view expressed in an article by Professor Jessup44 that Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins 45 was not intended to preclude the existence of a federal
common law governing legal problems affecting international relations. However, Sabbatino dealt with a problem having strong dip•
lomatic overtones,46 and the treatment to be accorded foreign
money judgments would seem to create no significant diplomatic
complications.47 A more analogous situation was presented in loan•
nou v. New York, 48 in which state legislation regulating the inheritance of property by aliens was alleged to intrude upon the exclusive
federal power in foreign affairs. The appeal to the Supreme Court
from a decision adverse to this contention was dismissed for lack of
a substantial federal question; Justices Black and Douglas, however,
felt that if the purpose of the legislation was to preclude unfriendly
governments from obtaining funds, it would be an unlawful attempt
to regulate foreign affairs.49 Since both the inheritance of property
in Ioannou and the recognition of money judgments involve only
private rights and apparently have only an indirect effect on the
affairs of foreign nations, it would seem that the Uniform Act is
within the constitutionally permissible powers of the states.60
damus); R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFUCT OF LAws § 117e, comment g (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1957) (full faith and credit requirements preclude refusal to recognize a sister
state judgment rendered in an inconvenient forum).
42. Apparently, no European country recognizes any defense similar to forum non
conveniens. See VON MERREN & TRAUTMAN, MUL11STATE PROBLEMS 765 n.271 (1965).
43. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). For analyses of Sabbatino, see Henkin, The Foreign Affairs
Power of the Federal Courts-Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 805 (1964); Comment, 63
MICH. L. REV. 528 (1965).
44• .Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964), referring to
Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law,
33 .AM. J. INT'L L. 740 (1939).
45. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
46. The question in Sabbatino concerned the effect to be accorded a decree by the
government of Cuba expropriating the sugar of a corporation of which ninety per
cent of the stockholders were United States citizens.
47. The recognition of foreign money judgments has been described as a question
of private rights rather than public relations. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Trans•
atlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 386-87, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926).
48. 371 U.S. 30, dismissing an appeal for want of a substantial federal question
from In the Matter of the Estate of Marek, 11 N.Y.2d 740, 181 N.E.2d 456 (1962).
49. 371 U.S. at 34.
50. See also Lenhoff, Reciprocity-The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw.
U.L. REv. 619, 762 (1954), suggesting that "there is no more reason for forcing the
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The question remains whether in diversity cases the Erie doctrine
compels federal courts to adhere to state law where the state omits
the reciprocity requirement. There are nQ federal cases disposing of
the issue.51 While one commentator has suggested an argument in
favor of retaining the requirement of reciprocity in federal courts
if it is a rule of evidence,52 it would seem erroneous to characterize
the rule of reciprocity as evidentiary. The doctrine of reciprocity
does not deal with the form of proof required to establish a right
to conclusive recognition. A judgment is admissible evidence in all
actions to collect on the judgment, regardless of whether a given
court adheres to the doctrine of reciprocity. The question is the
effect to be accorded the evidence, and there appears to be general
agreement, at least as regards domestic judgments, that with the exception of the federal question of '~full faith and credit," which has
no application to foreign judgments,53 state law controls the effect
to be accorded a prior judgment between the parties.54
The traditional "outcome test" for determining whether a federal
court must apply state law in a diversity case dictates that state law
must be applied if the application of a federal rule could reasonably
be expected to alter the result of the litigation.55 The doctrine of
reciprocity specifies that the merits of a case must be re-tried when
the country issuing the judgment does not conclusively enforce
American decrees; since the outcome of a new trial could differ significantly from the result achieved in the foreign proceedings, jt
seems clear that the outcome test requires federal courts to follow
state law as to reciprocity. This test has been somewhat weakened,
however, where federal involvement is significant.56 An example of
states to follow the United States Supreme Court in the question of recognition of
judgments of foreign countries than there would be for making them follow federal
law in other matters of conflict-of-law, such as choice of law problems. There is no
question that the latter [falls) within the power of the states ••.•"
51. In Gull v. Constam, 105 F. Supp. 107 (D. Colo. 1952), the court circumvented
the issue of lack of reciprocity because of the defendant's failure to plead it as a
defense.
52. Smith, supra note 3, at 15-16. Smith cited no authority for this proposition,
but he probably based it upon such cases as Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications,
Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961), in which it was held that hearsay evidence was
admissible in a diversity action brought in a federal court although the evidence
would not have been admissible in a state court and its admission by the federal
court affected the outcome of the case.
53. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912).
54. Cf. Ayers v. Kidney, 333 F.2d 812, 814 (6th Cir. 1964) (action to collect on a
judgment); Pallen v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (collateral estoppel); Makariw v. Rinard, 222 F. Supp. 336, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (res judicata). See also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), holding that
federal courts must apply state conflict-of-laws rules in diversity cases.
55. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
56. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (federal
rules apply where related to function of federal jury as established by the consti-
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this trend of allowing federal law to prevail is Hanna v. Plumer,tsr in
which the Supreme Court held that a difference in outcome did not
preclude the application of the federal rules for service of process set
forth in Rule 4(d)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the Court expressed in dictum that the policy of Erie was to discourage forum-shopping5 8 and that a state rule is to be followed when
"application of the rule would have so important an effect upon the
fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to enforce it would
be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court."60 This statement clearly indicates that federal courts should adhere to the omission of the reciprocity requirement in a state where the Uniform Act
is in force. Othenvise, foreign judgment creditors would avoid seeking enforcement of their judgment rights in federal courts if it were
possible to seek enforcement by a state court under the Uniform Act.
Except for its omission of the defense of lack of reciprocity, the
Uniform Act does not compel the enforcement of foreign money
judgments in situations other than those in which courts have been
accustomed to enforcement under the common-law principle of
comity. Indeed, the act's discretionary defenses could provide a
lower court with greater possibilities for avoiding enforcement, although the practical impact of these defenses may prove insignificant
if the courts exercise their newly acquired discretion in a manner
consistent with prior decisions. The major contributions of the Uniform Act, therefore, rest in compelling enforcement of qualifying
foreign money judgments rather-than basing their enforcement on
the elastic principle of comity, and in omitting the defense of reciprocity.
It remains to be seen whether the act will accomplish its goal of
aiding American judgment creditors in obtaining enforcement of
their American judgment rights in countries requiring reciprocity:
The codification has the advantage of assuring civil-law courts that
in certain instances their judgments will be enforced in state courts.
The Uniform Act is also a more comprehensive statement of the law
of recognition than has been achieved in most states by judicial fiat.
However, the many defenses to conclusive enforcement may lead
some foreign courts to declare that the Uniform Act does not provide
sufficient assurance that a state will conclusively enforce foreign
judgments. 60 Nevertheless, the general purpose of the act in seeking
tution); Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961) (hearsay
evidence); 15 VAND. L. REv. 1330 (1962).
57.
58.
59.
60.

380 U.S. 460 (1965).
Id. at 467-68.
Id. at 468 n.9.
See, e.g., Rh. & M., Reichsgericht (VII. Zivilsenat), March 26, 1909, 70 ENTSCHEI•
DUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZMLSACHEN 434, where the German Supreme Court
refused COJ!-clusive enforcement of decrees of state and federal courts in California
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to influence enforcement of American judgments abroad is the same
as that attributed to the Supreme Court in Hilton.61 The Court
attempted to achieve this goal by refusing to recognize a foreign
money judgment until the foreign court consented to recognize
American judgments. In seventy years, this highly criticized approach has achieved little but stalemate. 62 The drafters of the Uniform Act have recognized not only the futility of waiting for foreign
nations to take the initiative by recognizing American money judgments regardless of the effect given judgments of the foreign courts
in the United States, but also the injustice which this stalemate has
caused American judgment creditors.

on the grounds that California law did not meet reciprocity requirements. The German court felt that the California provisions for evaluating the jurisdiction of German
courts allowed re-examination of German judgments on the merits, that the defense
of fraud under California law went farther than was permitted under German law,
and that California afforded equitable remedies against final judgments which were
unavailable under German law. A discussion of this case is found in Nadelmann,
supra note 5, at 252-53.
61. See Peterson, supra note 13, at 305-06.
62. See, e.g., 2 BEAU, CONfLIrC OF LAwS § 434.3 (1935); Goonucn, CONFUCT OF
LAws § 208, at 605-08 (3d ed. 1949); Nadelmann, supra note 5, at 249-54; Peterson,
supra note 13, at 305-06; Reese, supra note 25, at 793; Smith, supra note 3, at 26-27;
Comment, 37 NorEx DAmE LAw. 88, 96 (1962). A uniform act was suggested in Nadelmann, Reprisals Against American Judgments?, 65 HARv. L. R-v. 1184, 1191 (1952),
as a possible means of obtaining conclusive recognition of American judgments
abroad.

